M eans and standard deviations are included to show a m easure of volatility. Table 3. This m ay indicate that greater sim ilarity of shocks across C olom bia, E cuador and Venezuela which in fact are all largely dependent on oil exports. Not surprisingly, output volatility is relatively high across the region.
C orrelation with the US is m uch sm aller, and in any case negative. Table 4. A nother useful m easure of the possibility of m onetary integration is similarity, of incom e levels. An unequal incom e distribution will lead to divergences, especially in fiscal policy. Table 5. Trade structure The m ore open an econom y is, the less effective is the te as a policy tool, and therefore the easier it is to enter particular, the greater the am ount of trade between partner the benefits o f form ing a m onetary union.
In fact, not only policy be ineffective in offsetting shocks in the region, but gain in term s of reducing transaction costs. In countries, the greater would exchange rate also there is m ore to. W hile Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela have displayed largely constant degrees of openness over the last 20 years, Colom bia and Ecuador have increased openness notably.
Furtherm ore, degrees of openness are not dissim ilar from those of m any European countries: Table 7. A second im portant index is the am ount of intraregional trade, i. In fact the larger the scale of intra-region trade, the less effective the nom inal exchange rate as a tool in the face o f asym m etric regional shocks. Table 8.
This m akes the region particularly vulnerable to dem and shocks in the U. All countries continue to be strongly dependent on traditional prim ary exports. Petroleum is an im portant. Andean export, the main producers being Venezuela, Ecuador and C olom bia. Table 9. Insufficient diversification of dom estic industrial structures also increases vulnerability, in particular in Bolivia, Peru and V enezuela. This is in net contrast to the European situation, w here m anufactures represent the m ajority of exports for all m em bers.
Not only does this entail greater likelihood o f countries being affected by sim ilar sectoral shocks, but m anufactures are also less susceptible to the type of international price fluctuations that historically plague com m odities. Labor m arket flexibility The theory tells us that the more mobile factors o f production within a region, the m ore likely the region is, c e te ris p a rib u s , to constitute an optim um currency area.
In fact, intraregional labor m obility can alleviate the adjustm ent process in the face of an a sym m etric shock. D irect evidence on inter-regional labor m obility is difficult to obtain, but since labor m obility is directly related to labor m arket flexibility, w e can use an index of em ploym ent protection as a proxy o f rigidity in.
H owever it should be noted that the index does not take into account institutional reform s since , ad gives m erely an ordinal, not a cardinal, m easure. Figure 3. Em ploym ent protection index. This show s once again the relative rigidity o f Andean labor m arkets, which appear in. On the other hand, as we have seen, no group o f countries has in fact fulfilled such criteria in a satisfactory m anner, not even those of the European Union.
Com paring characteristics o f the Andean C om m unity with those o f European countries can give som e indication o f how prepared Andean countries are for m onetary integration, but one should be careful in draw ing conclusions. Furtherm ore, as we have seen in the first part o f this paper, the econom ic argum ents for m onetary integration have shifted over tim e. W hile the O C A criteria can highlight certain advantages and disadvantages of adopting a com m on currency, especially for em erging econom ies the argum ents of financial stability and external creditw orthiness becom e increasingly im portant, possibly discounting any disadvantage suggested by the O C A theory.
Part o f the traditional credibility argum ent for m onetary integration is that the latter allow s w ea ker m em bers to free ride o f the greater policy credibility of their stronger partners. This argum ent, while im portant in the European Union, is less relevant in the Andean C om m unity w here no country sticks out as a paragon of strong m onetary policy. Very often in em erging m arkets reform s fail because governm ents lack credibility. M onetary integration can w ork as yet another com m itm ent tool within a regional agreem ent.
As is the case fo r any type o f com m itm ent m echanism , success depends on the value o f belonging to the arrangem ent and the cost o f defecting. In the case. The credibility argum ent becom es much stronger if the com m on currency considered is the US dollar. Dollarization avoids the need to create com plex intraregional institutions, such as a regional central bank. Furthermore, by eliminating exchange rate risk it immediately increases credibility, potentially increasing the level of confidence of international investors, contributing to larger and more stable capital flows, and ultimately leading to increased growth and w elfare in the region.
F e a r o f flo a tin g a n d d o lla riz a tio n As noted repeatedly above, we cannot discuss m onetary integration within Latin Am erica w ithout exam ining fear of floating and the degree o f dollarization in the Andean countries. To m easure the extent of fear o f floating, H ausm ann, Panizza and Stein use an index based on the ratio between international reserves and M2, as shown in Figure 4.
M onthly data from January to April is used in m ost cases. C ountries that exhibit fear o f floating are not in fact taking advantage of their m onetary policy independence, therefore dim inishing their costs o f entering a m onetary union. All three m easures show strong fear o f floating for Andean countries. As expected, the Andean countries appear strongly dollarized, in particular if com pared to other em erging markets. Furtherm ore, coordination of m onetary and exchange rate policies is key.
W ithin Europe the ERM system did w ork successfully for time, and exchange rates in Europe stabilized. However, for the tim e being the Andean C om m unity. Furtherm ore, the limited credibility o f such arrangem ents seem s to lim it their possibility o f success. If this is true, they do not appear to be taking advantage o f the free use o f their m onetary policies, w hich instead are dedicated to defending the exchange rate.
W hile a com m on currency m ight give greater credibility to A ndean m onetary policy, it w ould not help ensure greater stability with respect to external currency fluctuations. Although the institutions and the political will for a com m on currency do not exist at the m om ent, as integration evolves in the region this m ay develop.
In particular, the prerequisites fo r a m ove tow ards a com m on Andean currency are a greater political com m itm ent to deeper integration, the w illingness to give up m onetary sovereignty in fa vor o f supernational m echanism s, and m acroeconom ic coordination in m atters o f fiscal and financial discipline. From the point o f view o f the O C A criteria, this w ould be even less indicated than a com m on Andean currency.
H owever, we have seen th at there are m any benefits to be obtained through dollarization that are not considered in the O C A literature. Furtherm ore, the O C A theory does not take in a ccount the significant growth o f capital flows to the region in the last decades, and with it the increased im portance o f exchange rate risk. O ne of the greatest benefits of dollarization is the im m ediate elim ination o f exchange rate risk.
As seen in previous sections, there are how ever negative points that m ust not be overlooked. A m ongst the Andean countries C olom bia has recently adopted the strategy, Peru apparently will soon follow. In the case o f m onetary integration we consider a com m on currency shared with Venezuela, given that m ost intra-group trade is between these two countries. The basic estim ated m odel is m ade up of a Phillips curve like equation for inflation, and an aggregate dem and like curve for output gap.
In t is the annual discount rate and rerdepr the real exchange rate. For an example of monetary union simulation, see Benassy and Mojon , who compare a floating regime to monetary union between two European economies. For empirical work on dollarization, see for example Edwards and Edwards and Magendzo Free float: Interest rate determ ined by simple Taylor rule.
The ris k p re m iu m is a m easure o f country risk according to Standard and Poor, and s p re a d is the distance with respect to the Lom bard rate. The inflation target are the actual targets set by the C olom bian C entral Bank. The com m on exchange rate regim e is represented by identical interest rates in the tw o countries which at m ost differ for the country risk premium.
Annual growth rate in Colom bia is 3. Risk prem ium is constant, spread decreases follows trend. V enezuelan business cycle m ovem ents follow those of the preceding five year period. Venezuelan inflation fixed at The results o f the sim ulations are shown in table 11a. O utput growth show ed the highest variance in the case o f dollarization. Looking instead at the output gap, dollarization gave rise to a large negative and increasing output gap. The floating regim e registered the low est variance, dollarization the highest.
The more sim ilar the tw o econom ies o f C olom bia and V enezuela, i. On the other hand, as Venezuelan inflation increases, so does average inflation in Colom bia. Table 11b. The results of the sim ulation are m ostly consistent with the literature.
The m onetary union scenario tends to the free float one as the tw o econom ies converge. On the other hand, in the case o f divergence o f the two econom ies or asym m etric shocks, m onetary union is less desirable, in as it increases volatility and destabilizes the econom y. From these simple sim ulations, a flexible regim e appears, for the time being, the best course of action for Colombia.
The literature on credibility has been a first step tow ards taking into account these considerations. Em erging econom ies however, and Latin A m erica in particular, exhibit certain characteristics not found in industrialized econom ies, for w hich m ost o f the m onetary integration literature has been written. W hat little w ork has been done on the viability o f m onetary integration in em erging m arkets has been done w ithin the O CA fram ework. W hat is needed is a new fram ew ork that takes.
W ith respect to com parisons with European m onetary integration, there is an im portant caveat to be considered. For the Andean C om m unity to m ost fully reap the benefits of integration it is im portant that a com m itm ent be m ade tow ards deeper integration, beyond sim ple trade liberalization. And if deeper integration is to be successful, som e form of m onetary integration w ithin the region is inevitable. W hich form such integration should take will be object o f policy debate in upcom ing years.
Berg, Andrew and Borensztein, E. Borensztein, Eduardo, J. Zettelm eyer and T. Calvo, Guillermo and C. Eichengreen, Barry and R. Edwards, Sebastian and I. Edwards, Sebastian and M. W hat do we Need to Know? Giavazzi, Francesco and M. Hausmann, Ricardo, U. Panizza and E. Heckman; James and C. Mundell and Alexander K. Swodoba eds. DeGrauwe and L. Kydland, Finn and E.
Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo and F. Mussa, Michael, P. Masson, A. Swoboda, E. Jadresic, P. Mauro, and A. Obstfeld, Maurice and K. Perssori, Torsten and G. It begins with a historical review and a sum m ary o f fixed versus flexible exchange rate system s. Then it com pares the experiences o f recent currency unions, m ostly unilateral, and their relative econom ic perform ance during the recent currency crises in Latin Am erica, East Asia and Eastern Europe.
A set o f issues is discussed in order to weigh the overall costs and benefits for several econom ies. These issues include exchange rates, GDP perform ance, inflation rates and foreign reserves. Free banking is also considered in a fast-changing world w here there will probably be few er but better currencies. Key w ords: Dollarization, euroization, exchange rates, m onetary policy, m onetary union.
In the beginning G od created sterling and the fran c. On the secon d day He created the currency b oard and, Lo, m oney was w ell m anaged. On the third day G od d ecid ed that man should have fr e e will and so H e created the budget deficit. On the fou rth day, however, G od lo o k ed upon His work an d was dissatisfied. It was not enough. So, on the fifth day G od created the central ban k lo validate the sins o f man.
Then, w hile G od rested on the seventh day, man created inflation and the balan ce-of-paym en ts problem. For centuries up until the s, except during occasional periods o f w a r or other substantial disruption, the values o f national m onies w ere fundam entally defined by linking their values to som e external asset. Indeed, m ost of the m edium -sized industrial countries in Europe eschewed free floating and instead fastened their exchange rates increasingly tightly to the deutsche m ark for exam ple, Austria and the N etherlands closely pegged their m onies to the Germ an currency during m any years , and have now m oved on to full m onetary union with the euro.
Fixing the exchange rate is a simple, transparent, and tim e-honored w ay o f providing such an anchor, and for m any developing countries, there m ay be no readily available alternative. The issue o f separate national currencies has been hotly debated since the beginning of form al econom ic thinking with Adam Smith and the consolidation of independent nation states during the XVIII century.
A t that tim e, the central banks in the world could still be counted on a single hand. A currency board w as basically a fixed exchange rate regim e in which the colonial power issued paper currency for the colony but kept the real assets back in its central bank.
Since the currency of the colonial pow er was based on gold or silver, currency boards w ere ultim ately tied to gold or silver. The G erm an hyperinflation of is a rem inder o f how bad things can get w hen the link between real physical assets like gold and silver and paper money is lost. That hyperinflation w as stopped w ith the creation o f a currency board linking a new Germ an currency to the US dollar but, according to som e authors, the total outcom e o f this tragic inflationary experience helped to pave the road for the rise o f Hitler.
The rentenm ark w as born at the fixed exchange rate of 4. However, that w as just the first in a long series o f European hyperinflations. Austria, G reece, H ungary and Poland soon follow ed the tragic G erm an exam ple, both in term s o f econom ic disaster and in political turm oil. Both rightist and leftist political parties in G erm any share these view s today. Such variations therefore tend almost always to diminish the value of a money rent.
The incredible growth of central banking and the extensive use o f fiat m oney resulted in m any terrible episodes o f high inflation and outright hyperinflation. It is a sobering fact that the prominence of central banks in this century has coincided with a general tendency towards more inflation, not less. Since the collapse of the Bretton W oods system in , there has been a rapid growth o f literature dealing with different exchange rate regim es see table 1. This proliferation o f literature has been directly related to the proliferation of central banks around the world.
Table 1: Floating versus fixed exchange rate regim es Floating exchange rates. Then cam e the currency board system started by Britain in the XIX century for its colonies, in such a w ay as to give them a credible m oney but keeping the gold reserves in the London therefore, the currency board was ju s t a variation o f the gold or silver standard.
A fie r centuries o f relative m onetary stability, the world has basically passed from fixed to floating exchange rate regim es in the last 30 years. Data include all countries of the world that had at least 1 million people in plus East Germany, South Vietnam , and South Yemen. Countries for which no data are available for a particular category are excluded from the calculations. Source: Based on Schuler Poor monetary performance has cost many developing countries much-needed economic growth.
Although the great majority of independent countries today have central banks, central banking is only one of many possible monetary systems. Other monetary systems have been more successful than central banking in providing high-quality currencies in developing countries. The characteristics of the successful systems have been:.
Historical experience suggests that developing countries that w ant highquality currencies should abolish central banking. People continue to believe that every independent country should have its own central bank in part because the historical record of central banking.
This study for the first tim e com pares a variety of m easures o f currency quality for all m ajor countries since A second m ajor study was published two years later by three econom ists at the Internationa! M onetary Fund IMF. Atish R. G hosh et al. Table 3: Floating exchange rates versus currency boards Exchange rate system.
Short of adopting a common currency, currency board arrangements represent the most extreme form of exchange rate peg. This paper compares the macroeconomic performance of countries with currency boards to those with other forms of pegged exchange rate regime.
Currency boards are indeed associated with better inflation performance, even allowing for potential endogeneity of the choice of regime. Moreover, we find little evidence that currency boards result in more sluggish economic growth; on the contrary, countries with currency boards enjoyed significantly higher growth rates. Nonetheless, within the limitations imposed by the relatively small and specific sample o f countries with currency boards, the evidence in their favor is unequivocal.
O ne year later, Ricardo Hausm ann et al. It has not allowed for a more independent monetary policy. It has not permitted a more stabilizing monetary policy. It has produced higher real interest rates and smaller financial systems. However, they have had to pay the price of that unused flexibility through higher interest rates. If the benefits of exchange rate flexibility are limited and the costs are large, then fixing appears attractive.
This is expressed in the fact that not a single Latin American country today is able to place long-term debt denominated in its own currency. All long-term financial markets e. H ausm ann et al. However, the response to those issues escapes the econom ic arena and falls into the political arena: These three central questions need to be addressed in the context of concrete structures.
In this respect, two models are in the air: mimicking the Euro, or adopting the dollar. However, right now no Latin American currency is considered reserve currency and an am algamation of many weak currencies may not create a particularly strong one. Countries may fear that instead of reducing risks by adopting a single currency, they may be importing significant volatility from their very unstable neighbors.
In particular, the launching of the new currency designed to substitute national moneys is unlikely to prompt asset. Hence, existing exchange rate risks and mismatches would survive. Adopting the dollar would have clear advantages.
Its adoption would eliminate most of the very large exchange rate risks that exist in the balance sheets of corporations, homeowners and banks. H ausm ann argues, also in other papers, that the main shock affecting Latin Am erica is not so m uch the political shock as the econom ic shock o f bad policies.
Globalization has caused the disappearance of many flagship airlines and the appearance of foreign artistic designs on the tails of British Airways jumbo jets. Would a dollar bill with Columbus on it. A few m onths later, Ernesto Stein et al. This paper finds that: i. Countries with credible exchange rate commitments have had a lower and less volatile inflation The report. There are econom ies with different types of floating exchange rate regim es, currency boards like the Caym an Islands and Berm uda , dollarization British Virgin Islands and Panam a and, we m ay add, full m onetary union Puerto Rico.
G uillerm o Calvo , has also been w orking extensively on the issue of dollarization and its implications for Latin Am erica. He found that the effect is much larger in countries with floating exchange rate regim es Brazil and M exico com pared to econom ies with fixed exchange rate regim es Argentina then, Hong Kong and Panam a. These results suggest that, as opposed to several theories, the exchange rate flexibility does not isolate or protect dom estic interest rates from international interest rate m ovem ents.
Even though there is no doubt that fixed exchange rate regim es produce on average low er inflation than floating exchange rate regim es, there is som e discrepancy about growth and fiscal discipline. O rdinary citizens, particularly in developing countries, would agree that fixed exchange rates give at least more security.
The result is that the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. Ghosh and S. Inflations reached astronom ical figures, just as the econom ies fell in severe recessions and suffered heavy contractions. W hile food prices in N icaragua increased from a norm alized value o f in to nearly 1 trillion in , the G DP contracted 3. At the other extrem e, Panam a had the low est inflation in the continent even lower than in the USA and the highest real growth 2.
In less than one year the exchange rate dropped from a bout 3 to 8 pesos per dollar see table 5. And the four beasts said Am en A rgentines suffered no devaluation, no inflation, no loss o f foreign reserves, and a m ilder recession. The Argentines, w ho are less religious than m any M exicans, did not expect, the A pocalypse and held strong to their currency.
On the other hand, Argentina cleansed its banking system at no expense to its taxpayers. R obert M undell, Nobel Prize laureate, said in the middle of the crisis that in order to: Establish credibility, a successful fixed exchange rate system in Mexico would have to begin as a currency board, applied at least to new transactions, in which.
Mundell, originally from Canada, has hinted that his own native country is m ore likely to be united with the USA than with itself. The July devaluation of the Thai bath started a sinking spiral that ruined much of East Asia. A nother interesting com parison is Indonesia with a floating exchange rate regim e versus Hong Kong with its fixed exchange rate regim e.
D uring the East Asia crisis, two Nobel Prize laureates w ere openly proposing a currency board for Indonesia and other countries. Merton Miller Nobel and G ary Becker Nobel argued that defending the exchange rate would have avoided the series of com petitive devaluations that devastated large parts of East Asia. G ary Becker also said that a fixed exchange rate w ould reduce corruption and would increase the fiscal and m onetary responsibility.
Unfortunately, most developing countries do not have. A nother currency crisis exploded in , this tim e in Brazil. In A ugust , Russia devalued the ruble and the currency began a free fall that destroyed m ost o f its value see table 6. It is very interesting to note that not only did Estonia and Lithuania have relatively good econom ic perform ances in , but so did Latvia whose central bank operates a pseudo currency board based on the SDR and Finland which is part o f the European M onetary Union.
Source: Based on official country statistics and IMF. Besides com paring the success o f fixed versus floating exchange rate regim es on a regional basis, it is also im portant to com pare the success o f m oving from a. Argentina was the first such case in the s, even though there were m any currency boards before that tim e Hong Kong probably being the previous case m ost known.
In April 1, , Argentina created its currency board and left behind a huge creeping hyperinflation that reached 4, O bviously, there w as a painful restructuring, but Argentina becam e m ore com petitive. On July 1, , a currency board was created at the exchange rate o f leva 1, to DM 1.
Since then, the recovery has been im pressive, regardless of the very difficult situation in the Balkans. Ecuador is another recent exam ple o f a country fixing its currency. Then, on January 9, , the President said publicly that he would dollarize the econom y. Just that. N onetheless, the President was overthrow n two w eeks later but the dollarization process continued.
Fixing the exchange rate to a strong anchor seem s positive according to m ost historical evidence. The econom ic stability that Argentina experienced w hile its recent currency board lasted w as unusual considering the political scandals, kickbacks and other form s of corruption among its top m inisters and senators.
The same could be said about Bulgaria, which has survived very well all the m ayhem of the Balkan w ars next door Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Serbia. And Ecuador is recovering fast in spite o f the two quarreling C ongresses w orking in parallel during several w eeks. The dollarization of El S alvador January and the legalization of the dollar, in parallel with the quetzal, in G uatem ala May occurred under m ore stable conditions. And now there are news that even Afghanistan plans to dollarize in order to restart its m oribund econom y.
If there is less, then som e m oney can be borrowed or som e assets can be sold. He additionally. They m ostly com puted the advantages o f lower interest rates com pared to the disadvantages o f seigniorage lost. Sim ilarly, Zeljko Bogetic a concludes that the benefits o f fixing a w eak currency to a strong anchor currency outw eigh the costs. A fter m ore than a decade of stability under a currency board, the Argentine peso was devalued by Eduardo D uhalde the fifth president o f A rgentina in a period o f less than two w eeks.
However, instead of a m oderate devaluation and a sm ooth floatation, as predicted by econom ists favoring flexible exchange rate system s, the peso has been in a free fall since January The currency hit the m ark of 4 pesos per dollar only three m onths later, and there w as no end in sight.
The floatation o f the peso has been a com plete econom ic disaster and was used to confiscate the savings o f the citizens c o rra lito , break private contracts and destroy property rights. Even though 4 out 5 A rgentines favored keeping the system o f convertibility, the governm ent in turn chose to devalue the currency.
W e should ask, w ho benefited? C ertainly not the m ajority o f the people, w ho even dem onstrated against the devaluation and the confiscation o f their m oney. In fact, one o f the main reasons w hy Argentina had entered into the currency board, besides stopping inflation, w as to reduce m onetary corruption. Jose Maria Ibarbia , one of the Argentine legal advisors of the convertibility law, has in fact w ritten extensively about devaluation, inflation and corruption.
M any econom ists cam e with different analyses in term s of the costs and benefits o f com pletely dollarizing Argentina. Gabriel Rubinstein m ade one o f the m ost popular. Table 8: Benefits of dollarization in Argentina. Elimination of peso interest rates 2. Reduction of dollar interest rates: 2a. Less basis points 2b. Less basis points 2c. Less basis points 3.
Current seigniorage 4. Future seigniorage 5. Total: 5a. Source: Based on Rubinstein Pou also said that Argentina needed to return urgently to a currency board or dollarize. The currency board was introduced precisely to break this record. Dollarization would have accomplished something that Argentine governments have not done in more than a century: it would have enabled them to follow through on a commitment to protect the value of the currency. This would have marked a historic breakthrough.
Devaluation, with the right accompanying policies, might still work. The case of m onetary policy is one o f the best exam ples. So one has to ask: w hat currency? The answ er is clear: the currency and the econom y o f the politicians them selves, w ho live off printing m oney and using it for their own purposes.
That is w hy politicians prefer having currencies with patriotic nam es and sym bols, so they can fool the people through dem agoguery and populism. Som e econom ists also deserve much of the blam e for the deterioration of m onetary policy, since they have created the term s o f the debate used by the general public. W hen it com es to sugar, iron or shoes, econom ists have m ainly focused on the benefits for consum ers.
The preference of the econom ists for free trade and com petition is due to the em phasis on the well being o f the consum er. Free trade and com petition enable consum ers to find the best possible products; and thus consum ers can be relieved o f inferior goods and services. In m onetary policy, however, the m ajority o f econom ists have focused on the well being of the supplier: the governm ent. Instead of asking w hat consum ers w ant, m any econom ists have focused on w hat the governm ent w ants.
They have treated the econom y, through m onetary policy, as som ething that should benefit the governm ent the producer o f the m oney and not the citizens consum ers of the m oney. M any econom ists have prom oted or at least accepted as legitim ate the m onetary m onopoly and restrictions, exchange controls, legal requirem ents for the local currency and other privileges o f the central bank system s.
The disconcerting contradiction betw een m onetary policy and the free m arket is a terrible inconsistency in the world o f econom ics. One w ay to m anage such a contradiction is to deny that it exists, claim ing that the governm ent reflects the w ishes o f the citizens, or at least those o f the m ajority of the population.
Interest groups alw ays try to influence public policy to achieve privileges that benefit a m inority at the expense o f the m ajority. In fact, politicians are the first to benefit as producers of m oney, in addition to being the only group that decides its own selary and later produces the m oney to cover their expenses at the expense of everyone else. M oney is sim ply a com m odity for trading other goods and services, with its own producers and consum ers.
M onetary policy, as any public policy in general, should have as its goal to benefit consum ers, w ho obviously are the m ajority. A consum er of m onetary policy is anyone that uses m oney: Practically the whole population. W hat do consum ers w ant from m onetary policy?
The best w ay to find that out is to let citizens use the currency they prefer under a free m arket and com petition of currencies. Consum ers w ant little inflation and low interest rates. They also w ant a currency that can be used internationally w ithout any fear o f regulations or controls.
In Latin Am erica, there is already a currency that offers consum ers w hat they are looking for. That currency is the US dollar. The appeal of the US dollar can be seen both by its extensive use w ithin all the Latin Am erican econom ies from street vendors to the big traders and even the guerrilla and drug traffickers and its im portance as the main currency for international trade.
If the citizens w ere able to freely choose w hat m oney they w anted to use, the m ajority o f Latin Am ericans would probably adopt the US dollar. T hat w ay people consum ers could protect them selves from the recurring m onetary errors o f their governm ents the producers o f the m oney. The conventional thinking about m onetary policy has to change in order to prom ote econom ic developm ent with m onetary stability.
The key is the well being of the consum er and not o f the producer of m oney. M onetary sovereignty should com e from the citizens and not from the politicians. No country benefits from high inflation, high interest rates and exchange rate instability. The Latin Am erican experience show s that those w ho suffer the m ost are ordinary citizens, w ho are the consum ers of the m oney produced by irresponsible governm ents.
Today, the idea of governm ent m onopoly is dead or dying except in m oney. The governm ents should not have the pow er to force people to use a particular currency or to restrict the use o f other currencies. A m onetary standard should be kept, but the governm ents should not issue the m oney itself.
Free banking could be an excellent w ay to m ove the debate from the producers to the consum ers o f m oney. This would also elim inate the critique against dollarization o f losing the seigniorage. Through free banking the seigniorage would not only be kept in the country, but it would also be redistributed am ong the people through bank com petition and better services see table 9 from Schuler et al. Table 9: From dollarization to free banking Dollarization.
Adam Smith praised private currency for the benefits it had brought to his native Scotland, w here it still w orks nicely, as well as in Ireland and Hong Kong. M ost econom ists would agree that a legally enforced governm ent m onopoly is. The post office is a prim e exam ple; other exam ples range from state-ow ned plantations to national railroads.
C urrency is no exception to the rule. As with other nationalized products, quality is low er than it w ould be under private com petition. By comparison to public monopoly, privatization raises the quality of currency. A llow ing banks to issue their own notes m ight seem far-fetched or at least novel, but it is neither. M any financial firm s already issue paper travelers checks, which resem ble currency although they cannot pass from hand to hand w ithout having to be endorsed.
Before the 20th century, com m ercial banks issued. G overnm ents took over note issuance from com m ercial banks not because the private sector w as doing a bad job, but because governm ents wanted the profits fo r them selves. The record o f private issuance o f notes w as generally good. D ollar-denom inated notes issued by banks could offer three features that could m ake them m ore attractive for the public than Federal R eserve notes. One is a higher-quality supply. Federal Reserve notes in circulation outside the USA are often m ore w orn than usual, and small denom inations are scarce.
The third feature bank-issued notes could o ffe r is a rebate or lottery paym ent feature. Banks could offer cash back to m erchants w ho agree to accept and pay out their notes, much as credit card com panies offer inducem ents for m erchants to accept their credit cards. C om petition tends to pass along the rebates from m erchants to custom ers in the form o f low er prices.
One response is that people can use different currencies denom inated in a com m on unit o f account. People do not claim that every country should have only one bank that accepts deposits; w hy should every country have only one issuer of notes and coins? There is no w ay other than com petition to determ ine the costs and benefits from using one currency as opposed to another. Free banking m ay be the perfect w ay to returning m onetary sovereignty to the people.
The US dollar could thus becom e a truly international unit of account, issued by d ifferent banks around the world, just like credit cards and checks. W ith free banking, central banks m ight not even be needed anym ore in the future, as Kevin Dowd has suggested. Friedrich Hayek in his fam ous book called the D enationalisation of M oney, w ritten after receiving his Nobel Prize in , argued for the abolition of the governm ent m onopoly o f m oney.
According to him, central banks have been a disturbing source of inflation, instability, undisciplined fiscal expenditure and harm ful econom ic nationalism. One could argue that central banks represent com m unism in m onetary affairs: State control, governm ent m onopoly and central planning o f m oney.
O nly free com petition in m oney, supplied by private issuers w ho w an t business and public confidence, will lim it the quantity o f paper issue and thus m aintain its value. There is thus an immense educational task ahead before we can hope to free ourselves from the gravest threat to social peace and continued prosperity inherent in existing monetary institutions The dollar-yen rate has in the past been very unstable.
The dollar-euro rate may be in the future equally unstable If there is stability within each of the dollar, euro and yen areas, why should there be exchange rate fluctuations between them? Exchange rate uncertainty is an immediate cause of gross, excessive volatility in financial markets and the massive shifts in cross-border funds today. Indeed, the yen has fluctuated since yens per dollar in to less than 80 yen per dollar in , and now is back to around in early The result has been a com plete disaster for m any poorer nations.
In fact, the exchange rate fluctuations betw een som e neighboring Latin Am erican countries like Argentina and Brazil, Ecuador and Peru or C olom bia and Venezuela have in general been dism al since the collapse o f the Bretton W oods system. Such large fluctuations have had terrible consequences not ju s t for the internal stability o f the countries but also for the external stability and all cross-border trade and investm ent.
M any experts have insisted about a more stable world with very few currencies. M undell has been clear about going forw ard with few er but stronger regional currencies, and eventually m aybe ju st a single world currency. In fact, president Vicente Fox of M exico d iscussed with the US president and C anadian prime m inister about an eventual m onetary union for North Am erica.
Thom as C ourchene and Richard Harris have studied the full range o f possibilities for m onetary arrangem ents betw een Canada and the USA. In Central Am erica m any people talk about a Central Am erican peso based on the US dollar , and the sam e in the C aribbean with a C aribbean dollar for all the islands, including Cuba w here the US dollar was also legalized as tender currency in O utside the Am ericas, m onetary unions have been discussed in m any parts of the w orld.
N orw ay and Iceland also seem to be w arm ing to the idea, although they are still not m em bers o f the EU. In the Arab w orld, the G ulf. C ooperation C ouncil G C C announced in that it w as going to create a com m on currency by Even in Asia, w here there is such a large disparity o f countries, som e people have talked about eventual m onetary union. As Irving Fisher said alm ost a century ago: We have standardized every other unit in commerce except the most important arid universal unit of all, the unit of purchasing power.
What business man would consent for a moment to make a contract in terms of yards of cloth or tons of coal, and leave the size of the yard or the ton to chance? Balino, T. Washington: IMF. Barro, FI. Becker, G. Begg, D. Berg, A. Bogetic, Z. Buiter, W. Calvo, G. Caprio, G. Cavallo, D. Coats, W. Cohen, B. Cooper, R. Cordeiro, J. Courchene, T. Howe Institute Commentary, June. Dale, R. Bank of Finland. De Grg. Dorn, J. Vancouver: Fraser Institute.
Available online at http. BusinessWeek, May 19, p. BusinessWeek, New York. Dowd, K. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Edwards, S. The Wall Street Journal, August 28, p. Eichengreen, B. Enoch, C. Fisher, I. Fischer, S. January, , IMF, Washington. Journal o f Political Economy, vol.
Frankel, J. Working Paper No. Friedman, M. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Galbraith, J. Ghosh, A. Gil Diaz, F. Grubel, H. Hanke, S. Hausmann, R. Hayek, F. Ibarbia, J. International Monetary W ashington. International Monetary Fund. Joint Economic Committee , Encouraging official dollarization in emerging markets.
Kenen, P. Banjul, Central Bank of Gambia, Gambia. McKinnon, R. Larrain, F. Foreign Policy, Washington. Levy-Yeyati, E and Sturzenegger, F. Liviatan, N. World Bank Discussion Paper , Washington. Moreno, J. Mundell, R. Zagreb, Croatian Institute for Banking and Insurance. Porter, R. Pou, P. Roubini, N. Rubinstein, G. Sachs, J.
Selgin, G. A9, New York. Schuldt, J. Schuler, K. Schuler K. Schwartz, A. Stein, E. Stein, R. US Congress. Bill numbers: S. Walters, A. White, L. The Liberty Fund. Williamson, J. Dicho portafolio se adm inistra bajo estrictos criterios de. Pero esa es justam ente la tarea que ya. Profesor de la Universidad de los Andes y de la Universidad Metropolitana. Eliana Mayorca. De esta experiencia se deduce la necesidad de adoptar un banco central com o ancla de la credibilidad del BCS y por ende del SMU.
Debem os considerar que uno de los objetivos del BCS es garantizar el correcto funcionam iento y estabilidad del sistem a financiero. En el cuadro No. En todo caso, el cuadro No. Cuadro No. Banco Central Europeo. Barraza, R. Bordo, M. Capote, H. Cuadrado, J. Me Graw Hill. Edward, S. Frankel J. Fratzcher, M. Freixas, X. Frenkel, A. Gretschmann, K. Holmes, M. VI, No. Masson, P. Goldstein, pp. Pineda, J.
Rubini, H. Strauss, M. Sutherland, A. Vega, R. William, P. Zahler, R. En esta circunstancia, la ortodoxia estima que los movimientos. Es decir, con menor consumo y con menor empleo. Form alm ente los residuos deben form ar una serie I O. Los corolarios del resultado anterior son: -.
En consecuencia se postula que :. Los niveles de significancia T-Student , en general, muestran una mayor importancia para la influencia del tipo de cam bio,12 tal como se muestra en el Cuadro No. En otras palabras, desde el punto de vista de la P.
Este hecho dificulta la labor de las autoridades. Esto es, realizar el contraste de Hausman para fixed effect vs. Valo , Critico P 3 0 1. Miles de reales hasta inclusive; m illones de reales desde Desde corresponde al tipo de cam bio del m ercado libre.
Aglietta, M. Bernacer, G. Bouvet, P. Montreal, Hahn y Breechling eds. Clinton, K. Corckett, A. Davidson, P. De Gregorio, J. Elie, B. Por un lado, ellos siguen girando hacia la misma clase de indias periodistas, activistas e intelectuales para 'conocimiento local'. Sin embargo, estos informantes nativos simplemente hablan la charla del Oeste al Oeste". El ex subsecretario de Estado William J. El nombramiento en enero de del ex embajador de la India a los EE. La guerra de entre Rusia y Georgia y la crisis europea de la deuda soberana de , tras la crisis de EE.
Francia y Alemania son los principales impulsores del proyecto europeo. Las restricciones impuestas por el Tratado de sobre el establecimiento final con respecto a Alemania efectivamente subordina a Alemania a las cuatro potencias EE. Vivimos en un mundo cambiante donde los retos son infinitos. Siete rondas de negociaciones se ha completado sin llegar a una Acuerdo de libre comercio. Tiene que haber un dar y recibir, Tiene que haber realismo en las negociaciones cuando se reanuden.
Es hora de dejar de mirar. Los funcionarios europeos se sabe que persisten con narrativas estereotipadas y las quejas de que la India es de escasos recursos. Idiomas: 22 lenguas son reconocidas como lenguas oficiales. La India ha sido varias veces descrita como una democracia ruidosa, con incesante activismo. India no es parte de ninguna alianza militar.
|Declaracion ganancias forex peace||When you stop trading for some time, so you recognize that you were in the range out of control and you cause damage to yourself. The Expert Advisor has been developed for news trading, but can also be used for forex modeling at any time. This can be accomplished by holding the appropriate currency futures contract s recency effect investing maturity and taking physical delivery of the contracted sum in Canadian dollars at the end of the contract. In any case, Europe rem ains a benchm ark case for all other countries looking to achieve regional integration. The Forex market is by far the largest financial market one may come across. W ith respect to com parisons with European m onetary integration, there is an im portant caveat to be considered. Insufficient diversification of dom estic industrial structures also increases vulnerability, in particular in Bolivia, Peru and V enezuela.|
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|Declaracion ganancias forex peace||In fact the larger the scale of intra-region trade, the less effective the nom inal exchange rate as a tool in the face o f asym m etric regional shocks. In addition, the top 5 binary option brokers do only include brokers whose clients have expressly indicated that withdrawal requests were handled quickly. But this does not mean you will know whether you will win or lose in any of the trading deals, but this declaracion ganancias forex peace means that you have to plan for a possible loss or a possible win, so it should not be surprised. Schuldt, J. It follow s that there can be little co-ordination o f m onetary and forex modeling policy. However, you need to fill in a form for this to be activated. HotForex is an award winning, regulated and licensed online forex and commodities broker.|
El entrenamiento en el trabajo es suficiente. Te explicamos todo lo que necesitas saber. Trading Instruments. Volume lots per day. Possible income. Debe estar preparado para la posibilidad de que varios lotes seguidos pierdan. Para demostrarlo, hagamos un viaje al pasado para ver algunos ejemplos de ganancias extremadamente grandes y destacar episodios claves en la historia del mercado mundial de divisas.
Los ejemplos anteriores demuestran que puedes ganar mucho dinero en Forex y no es necesario ser economista. La edad a la que comienzas a operar tampoco es importante. Tu deposito. Tu ingreso:. Factores favorables para ganar en Forex:. Empezar con una gran cantidad de dinero. Arriesgar los bonos. Seguir las noticias sin descanso. Si bien, al principio, ganar dinero en Forex como trader no es tu principal fuente de ingresos, debes dedicarle tanto tiempo como sea razonablemente posible, sin afectar tu trabajo principal, tu cordura o tu salud.
Esto se debe a la alta volatilidad imprevisibilidad de las cotizaciones de todos los instrumentos de trading del mercado de divisas. Jacobo Morales. Sin embargo, no hacerlo siguiendo la normativa puede tener consecuencias. La historia de Francisco Vallejo es un buen ejemplo. A modo de ejemplo , imagina que has invertido en bolsa y has ganado 2. En este sentido, recuerda que El Gordo de Navidad, la Quiniela, El Euromillones y otros juegos de azar similares tienen su propia fiscalidad.
Y es que, no todas las inversiones funcionan igual a efectos fiscales. Para que lo entiendas mejor, en caso de que hayas perdido con acciones, fondos, ETFs Este es el caso de Pedro. Este es el resultado global de sus inversiones en En otras palabras, usar los 1.
Ejemplo 2: Compensar ganancias de la venta de la casa. El dinero obtenido por la venta de la vivienda se considera una ganancia patrimonial a efectos de IRPF.